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Revus - številka 48, letnik 2022
Revus je prva revija za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava na Zahodnem Balkanu. Z večjezičnostjo se ponuja tudi kot edini regionalni pravni forum. Strogi izbirni postopek in mednarodna indeksiranost vsebine pa zagotavljata kakovost in odmevnost v njej objavljenih razprav in člankov.
Strokovna revija
Andrej Kristan
Luka Burazin
Matija Žgur
Klub Revus - Center za raziskovanje evropske Ustavnosti in demokracije
Lawrence Alexander (San Diego), Robert Alexy (Kiel), Manuel Atienza
(Alicante), Lidija Basta Fleiner (Beograd), Petar Bojanić (Beograd),
Bartosz Brożek (Krakow), Eugenio Bulygin (Buenos Aires),
Pierluigi Chiassoni (Genova), Timothy Endicott (Oxford), Riccardo Guastini
(Genova), Kenneth Himma (Seattle), Eric Millard (Paris),
François Ost (Bruxelles), Ivan Padjen (Rijeka), Marijan Pavčnik
(Ljubljana), Ciril Ribičič (Ljubljana), Branko Smerdel (Zagreb),
Andraž Teršek (Koper), Michel Troper (Paris), Jan Woleński
(Krakow), Boštjan M. Zupančič (Ljubljana)
Matej Avbelj, Bojan Bugarič, Karine Caunes, Bruno Celano, Paolo Comanducci, Luís Duarte d'Almeida, Franc Grad, Stefan Haussler, Giulio Itzcovich, András Jakab, Rajko Knez, Arne Mavčič,
Marko Milanović, Luka Omladić, Dennis Patterson, Giorgio Pino, Francesca Poggi, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Juan Ruiz Manero, Vasilka Sancin, Dale Smith, Maja Smrkolj, Vojko Strahovnik, Antal Szerletics,
Katja Šugman Stubbs, Dominika Švarc, Massimiliano Vignolo
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Tomasz Zygmunt
An intuitive approach to judicial expertise
Research shows that expert performance in many fields of activity is embodied in an expert level of intuition. This appears to be true in predictable domains with fixed rules. However, evidence suggests that this type of expertise also exists among representatives of more naturalistic domains, such as firefighters or art specialists. This paper considers whether a kind of expertise embodied in expert intuition can occur in judges. It supports the thesis that it is possible to achieve expert intuition in the scope of some types of court situations consisting of legal problems with an objective legal standard for solving them. However, legal intuition is ineffective in cases involving legal problems with no such standard, and thus it cannot be developed to the expert level in this respect. The paper discusses two model examples of comparable legal problems: those that generate a completely novel normative issue for judges, and those that create a conflict between judicial intuitions, frequently regarding the relation between law and morality. In both of these situations there are no visible environmental regularities (repetitive patterns of legal practice) to adapt, and hence, it is impossible to perform a deliberate practice – a form of training indispensable for developing expert intuition – for legal decision-making. Legal intuitive expertise, therefore, appears to be powerless in determining the holistic answers to some legal court cases, despite the skills and experience of the judge.
Silvia Zorzetto
A constructivist conception of legal interpretation
This essay explores a number of issues central to a value-based yet positivist conception of law and legal interpretation. In particular, after some reflections on whether and in what sense a theory of law can be considered axiologically and/or methodologically superior, some classic issues in the theory of legal interpretation are discussed: the distinctions of noetic versus dianoetic interpretation, interpretatio legis versus iuris, and simple versus difficult cases. The analysis then focuses on the claim to correctness inherent in legal reasoning, on its pragmatic connotations, on its controversial relations to the thesis of the so-called separation of law and morality, and to ethical conformism. I argue that the conception of legal interpretation proposed by Isabel Lifante is instead a non-neutral conception of law that contributes to the reinforcement of a Dionysian and Herculean legal practice.
Paula Gaido
El método y el objeto de la teoría del derecho según Cristina Redondo
" En Positivismo jurídico “interno”, Cristina Redondo busca articular los presupuestos meta-teóricos de un enfoque dirigido al estudio del derecho, que pueda explicar su específico carácter normativo. En esta tarea, dirigirá sus argumentos a defender, entre otras, dos tesis principales: (i) que la teoría del derecho puede ser moralmente neutral respecto de su objeto; y (ii) que las normas jurídicas constituyen necesariamente una razón en sentido formal, independientemente de la corrección sustancial de los contenidos que expresen. Esto implica que, para la autora, es posible formular enunciados referidos al contenido del derecho puramente descriptivos; es decir, desde un punto de vista que no presupone su aceptación. La expresión “positivismo jurídico ‘interno’” es la terminología elegida por Redondo para dar cuenta del tipo de enfoque metodológico necesario para que una teoría del derecho positivista à la Hart sea posible. En este escrito introductorio me propongo hacer una síntesis de las principales tesis que la autora defiende en su libro, para luego trazar los puntos centrales que trabaron la discusión con quienes participaron en el Symposium sobre Positivismo jurídico “interno” que se publica en esta revista."
Jorge L. Rodríguez
On the possibility of an internal legal positivism
In her latest book Cristina Redondo provides an excellent defense of the position she qualifies as Internal Legal Positivism, according to which it is possible to formulate statements referring to the content of the law, conceived as a normative entity, that are purely descriptive and expressed from a point of view that does not presuppose their acceptance. In this paper I will restrict myself to three rather marginal observations, raising some doubts, first, about the strategy of contesting the so-called impossibility thesis; second, on a point related to the two senses of the distinction between the internal and external points of view that Redondo proposes to differentiate and, third, regarding a consequence that derives from it for the critical evaluation of interpretivist theories such as Ronald Dworkin’s. I then formulate some conclusions of that analysis.
Véronique Champeil-Desplats
Un positivismo jurídico “interno”: ¿por qué? ¿cómo?
Tras una metódica y erudita discusión de importantes autores de la teoría del derecho, María Cristina Redondo defiende la posibilidad de un positivismo jurídico “interno”, que al contrario de lo que hace una aproximación dogmática, analiza el derecho sin justificarlo. Sostiene, además, que una concepción ontológica institucional del derecho sería la forma más adecuada de conseguirlo. La propuesta plantea varias cuestiones: ¿Cómo concretamente es posible analizar el derecho desde un punto de vista interno? ¿Cuál es el corpus objeto de la investigación? ¿Es un enfoque institucional del derecho, si no el único posible, el mejor? Este artículo toma en serio las propuestas teóricas de María Cristina Redondo, considerando la posibilidad de un positivismo interno basado en otras concepciones ontológicas del derecho.
Pablo A. Rapetti
Internal legal positivism: “Hurrah,” “Boo,” “Ehhh…”?
This paper offers a focused analysis of Cristina Redondo’s latest book, Positivismo jurídico “interno.” I first point out the lack of a discussion regarding what a participant (of the legal practice) is. I then emphasize that Redondo’s distinctions between the internal and external points of view, which she offers in order to shape her favoured form of positivistic metatheory, are incompatible with an expressivistic rendition of first-order legal language. Since what constitutes the best rendition of first-order legal language is a controversial theoretical matter, a metatheoretical framework would be, in principle, preferable to others since it does not prejudge such a matter. Finally, I suggest an alternative strategy to arrive at a metatheoretical model similar to Redondo’s, but which does not incur that particular problem.
Santiago Legarre
"Internal" legal positivism in the light of natural law
This article focuses on the use of the term and the concept “natural law theory” in Cristina Redondo’s book Positivismo jurídico “interno”. The article notes how Redondo’s analysis of natural law theory is lacking in that the idea she attributes to that theory of reducing legal norms to moral norms is absent in true “natural law theory”. For this theory there are two ways of deriving positive law from natural law, which Redondo does not account for. Furthermore, her understanding ommits the reality that according to natural law theory unjust laws are laws. Finally, this article tries to show posible ways in which Redondo’s theory may be compatible with natural law theory.
Rodrigo E. Sánchez Brigido
The concept of law as a functional concept
In her book Positivismo jurídico "interno", Cristina Redondo claims that legal theory can be neutral from a moral point of view. An essential part of her argument is based on the criticism of an anti-positivist conception of law developed by Fernando Atria according to which, since law is a functional concept, no descriptive or morally neutral theory of law can be provided. The essay claims that, while Atria's conception of law encounters some difficulties, Redondo's criticisms miss the mark leaving their impact inconclusive. More importantly, there are two kinds of natural law theory that also claim that law is a functional concept but that do not face Atria's difficulties. One such theory seems particularly suitable for avoiding not only Redondo's criticism but also standard objections from the positivist camp. If this type of theory is correct, a theory of law cannot be morally neutral.
María Gabriela Scataglini
Interpretative conventions and legal positivism
The thesis that the content of law depends on the "interpretative conventions" of legal practice implies that what the rules establish is not always determined by their literal meaning. To leave aside the literal interpretation of a word (by extending or limiting its ordinary meaning) or the literal interpretation of a rule (for example, by considering a circumstance as an exception, even if it is not explicitly mentioned), and to argue that it is what the law requires means entering the realm of the implicit. But what is "the implicit"? Does it consist in the criteria implicit in the social practice of law (i.e., in the interpretative conventions "without restrictions") or only in what the legislator has implicitly established (i.e., in the interpretative conventions "with restrictions")? In light of this distinction, recently pointed out by Cristina Redondo, I discuss some of the questions she raises about the "relevance thesis" of the legal system as something other than the "relevance hypothesis", and I critically discuss her view that the choice between the interpretative conventions "without restrictions" and those "with restrictions" implies a choice between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism.
Ezequiel Monti
Redondo on the normativity of law
In her latest book, Positivismo jurídico “interno”, Cristina Redondo defends a novel account of the normativity of law. According to Redondo, the law does not claim legal rules to be substantive reasons to act as they require. Rather, she argues, law only intends legal rules to be recognized as logically non-defeasible rules to be used as premises in formal arguments whenever they apply. Thus, the law claims legal rules to be reasons only in a linguistic-formal sense, independently of their impact on what people ought to do. Here, I shall argue that Redondo's arguments against the view that law intends legal rules to be substantive reasons (or to be treated as such) are misguided, and that her own positive proposal according to which law claims legal rules to be reasons in a merely formal sense ought to be rejected.
María Cristina Redondo
Afinando el positivismo jurídico interno
En este artículo trataré de contestar a algunos de los comentarios y críticas planteados por autores que participaron en la discusión de mi libro Positivismo jurídico ‘interno’. He agrupado las criticas en seis puntos. Primero, la posibilidad de un positivismo jurídico interno y la pluralidad de enfoques metodológicos con relación al derecho. Segundo, la ambigüedad de la distinción “interno” - “externo”. Tercero, el convencionalismo en general y las convenciones interpretativas en particular. Cuarto, el iusnaturalismo y el anti-positivismo (metodológicos). Quinto, participantes y aceptantes, cognitivistas o no cognitivistas. Sexto, el derecho como razón para la acción.