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Revus - številka 33, letnik 2017

Revus

Revus je prva revija za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava na Zahodnem Balkanu. Z večjezičnostjo se ponuja tudi kot edini regionalni pravni forum. Strogi izbirni postopek in mednarodna indeksiranost vsebine pa zagotavljata kakovost in odmevnost v njej objavljenih razprav in člankov.

Strokovna revija
Andrej Kristan
Luka Burazin
Matija Žgur
Klub Revus - Center za raziskovanje evropske Ustavnosti in demokracije
Lawrence Alexander (San Diego), Robert Alexy (Kiel), Manuel Atienza (Alicante), Lidija Basta Fleiner (Beograd), Petar Bojanić (Beograd), Bartosz Brożek (Krakow), Eugenio Bulygin (Buenos Aires), Pierluigi Chiassoni (Genova), Timothy Endicott (Oxford), Riccardo Guastini (Genova), Kenneth Himma (Seattle), Eric Millard (Paris), François Ost (Bruxelles), Ivan Padjen (Rijeka), Marijan Pavčnik (Ljubljana), Ciril Ribičič (Ljubljana), Branko Smerdel (Zagreb), Andraž Teršek (Koper), Michel Troper (Paris), Jan Woleński (Krakow), Boštjan M. Zupančič (Ljubljana)
Matej Avbelj, Bojan Bugarič, Karine Caunes, Bruno Celano, Paolo Comanducci, Luís Duarte d'Almeida, Franc Grad, Stefan Haussler, Giulio Itzcovich, András Jakab, Rajko Knez, Arne Mavčič, Marko Milanović, Luka Omladić, Dennis Patterson, Giorgio Pino, Francesca Poggi, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Juan Ruiz Manero, Vasilka Sancin, Dale Smith, Maja Smrkolj, Vojko Strahovnik, Antal Szerletics, Katja Šugman Stubbs, Dominika Švarc, Massimiliano Vignolo

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Luís Duarte d’Almeida

Luís Duarte d’Almeida

On pre-conventions as ‘normative facts’

In his essay “Pre-Conventions: A Fragment of the Background”, Bruno Celano seems to endorse three claims about what he calls ‘pre-conventions’: (a) that such ‘entities’ exist; (b) that they are neither rules nor de facto regularities; and (c) that their ‘character’ is at once factual and normative: that pre-conventions are “literally, ‘normative facts’.” I suggest that (a) and (b) are not particularly striking claims, and that Celano’s case for (c) is unpersuasive.

Rodrigo Sánchez Brigido

Rodrigo Sánchez Brigido

Celano on normative facts

In “Pre-Conventions. A Fragment of the Background”, Celano argues that there are ways of acting that can be called “conventions” which are, literally, normative facts. There are a number of interesting claims in Celano’s paper about the nature of these conventions, and showing that they amount to normative facts is only part of his strategy for establishing their significance. But given that the question of whether there are normative facts deserves a treatment of its own, the paper inquires whether Celano’s account of normative facts (whether conventional or not) is plausible. It then makes three claims. First, it claims that Celano’s account of normative facts is in need of clarification. Amongst other reasons, there is no proper characterisation of either the concept of fact or of the concept of norm. Second, the paper claims that, under a relatively acceptable way of understanding facts and norms, Celano’s argument in favour of normative facts needs to be completed. But if the argument is completed by appealing to the general philosophical outlook which Celano seems inclined to employ (Searle’s), the argument reaches a point where it becomes unstable. This does not, of course, mean that the project should be abandoned. An argument within the same line of thought may be available. But the prospect seems uninviting. So, thirdly, the paper proposes a sketch of an alternative, Kantian-like conception of normative facts based on an argument put forward by Christine Korsgaard.

Marco Segatti

Marco Segatti

What laws are experienced as

The aim of this comment is to discuss tentatively one way of understanding, for the study of legal phenomena, some of the implications of recognising the existence of peculiar entities which Celano calls pre-conventions. This comment speculates that, if Celano is right, then so-called paradigm cases of law lose some of their philosophical centrality. To study pre-conventions, one needs to collect accounts of situations in which relevant agents use criteria for identifying legal phenomena that only approximate valid sources of law. To provide such accounts, the traditional informational focus of a philosophical analysis of law also needs, this comment further speculates, substantial broadening: if pre-conventions are in the body, then that is where we need to look if we want to study them.

Pierluigi Chiassoni

Pierluigi Chiassoni

Do jurists need pre-conventions?

Ali pravniki potrebujejo pred-konvencije? Avtor v komentarju primerja pravno teorijo normativnih dejstev in Celanovo teorijo pred-konvencij ter predlaga dva načina, kako bi lahko slednja bila v korist dobronamernim pravnikom.

Sebastián Figueroa Rubio

Sebastián Figueroa Rubio

How can we explain pre-conventions?

Kako lahko razložimo pred-kovencije? V tem komentarju Celanovih »Pred-konvencij« si avtor zastavi vprašanje: katera je najboljša razlaga ravnanj, ki jih je mogoče označiti za pred-konvencije? Avtor razišče nekaj možnih odgovorov. Na koncu se povpraša po mogočih posledicah Celanovega predloga.

Bruno Celano

Bruno Celano

Exploring the Background: puzzles, afterthoughts, and replies

Raziskovanje Ozadja: zagonetke, nakdnadni razmisleki in odgovori. V tem zapisu avtor preuči komentarje in odgovori na kritike, naslovljene na njegovo besedilo Pred-konvencije. Fragment Ozadja, objavljene v številkah 30 in 33 Revije za ustavno teorijo in filozofijo prava - Revus. Svoje odgovore razdeli na naslednje sklope: 1. Družbena razsežnost pred-konvencij; 2. Pred-konvencije ter običajne navade in nagnjenja; 3. Ali so njegovi primeri napačni; 4. Razlogi in vzroki; 5. Normativna dejstva; 6. Ali so lahko abstraktne entitete vzroki; 7. Ali so pred-kovencije pogoj Lewis-konvencij?; 8. Kako so lahko pred-konvencije koristne za pravno teorijo?; 9. Ali se uspešno razbremeni argumentativnega bremena.

Donald E. Bello Hutt

Donald E. Bello Hutt

Against judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation

Rejecting judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation, this paper argues that understanding the interpretation of constitutions to be a solely legal and judicial undertaking excludes citizens from such activity. The paper proffers a two-pronged classification of analyses of constitutional interpretation. Implicit accounts discuss interpretation without reflecting on whether such activity can or should be performed by non-judicial institutions as well. Explicit accounts ask whether interpretation of constitutions is a matter to be dealt with by courts and answer affirmatively. I criticise both camps. Implicit accounts fail to explain why constitutional interpretation is purely judicial in character. Explicit accounts do not provide enough reasons why the judiciary is allegedly the ideal institution to give constitutions meaning with final authority, both in instrumental and normative terms. The paper closes by suggesting avenues for future research.

Jordi Ferrer Beltrán

Jordi Ferrer Beltrán

El control de la valoración de la prueba en segunda instancia

The review of the assessment of evidence in appellate court decisions: immediacy and evidentiary inferences | In this article, the author analyses the relation between the principle of immediacy and the review of evidential reasoning at the appellate level. He demonstrates the scope of review over the quality of evidential reasoning that can be realized without it affecting the principle of immediacy – appropriately understood. For this purpose, he examines a first level criminal court decision, indicating the different steps in its reasoning regarding the facts of the case and showing how its shortcomings can be reviewed.

Damir Banović

Damir Banović

Izzivi ustavnega prava v 21. stoletju

Predmet te knjižne ocene je: Izzivi ustavnega prava v 21. stoletju. Liber Amicorum Ciril Ribičič. Ur. M. Žgur, N. Kogovšek Šalomon in B. Koritnik. Maribor: ILSJN 2017.

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