TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Metanormativna načela in z normami urejano družbeno življenje. Če kritično preverimo opredelitev normativnega sistema, ki sta jo z uporabo teorije množic podala Alchourrón in Bulygin, ugotovimo, da deduktivna zaprtost ni njegova neizbežna lastnost. Sledeč von Wrightovemu sklepu, da aksiomi standardne deontične logike opisujejo popolnostne lastnosti množice norm, avtorja predstavita algoritem, ki modalni jezik prevaja v jezik teorije množic. Prevodi nam razkrijejo, da ima verodostojnost metanormativnih načel različne temelje. Ob ločitvi igralnih vlog, ki jih imajo udeleženci z normami urejane interakcije, se izkaže, da so metanormativna načela usmerjene obveznosti drugega reda, predvsem pa, da so zahteve, povezane z deduktivno zaprtostjo, naslovljene na vlogo uporabnika norm in ne na vlogo njihovega ustvarjalca. Če ločevanje vlog uporabimo tudi na primeru čiste derogacije, pridemo do novih zaključkov. Ugotovimo namreč, da je neodvisnost iz vidika morebitne derogacije popolnostna lastnost dane množice norm. Avtorja se tako polemično dotikata nekaterih točk, ki jih je nedavno v svojem članku izpostavil Kristan.

Critical examination of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s set-theoretic definition of normative system shows that deductive closure is not an inevitable property. Following von Wright’s conjecture that axioms of standard deontic logic describe perfection-properties of a norm-set, a translation algorithm from the modal to the set-theoretic language is introduced. The translations reveal that the plausibility of metanormative principles rests on different grounds. Using a methodological approach that distinguishes the actor roles in a norm governed interaction, it has been shown that metanormative principles are directed second-order obligations and, in particular, that the requirement related to deductive closure is directed to the norm-applier role rather than to the norm-giver role. The approach has been applied to the case of pure derogation yielding a new result, namely, that an independence property is a perfection-property of a norm-set in view of possible derogation. This paper in a polemical way touches upon several points raised by Kristan in his recent paper.