TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Visa Kurki’s ‘A Theory of Legal Personhood’ makes an impressive effort to put legal personhood on a more rigorous analytical footing without shying away from contentious issues such as the legal rights and personhood of foetuses, AIs, and animals. Focusing on its contribution to animal rights law, I show in this review that despite its numerous strengths, the book also has important shortcomings. A particular problem that stands out is that Kurki’s theory of legal personhood is built on an uncharitable reading of the accounts of two leading animal rights proponents. Unlike Kurki suggests, these accounts do not equate legal personhood with rights-holding, but with fundamental rights-holding. This position—which I call the Fundamental Rights View—can explain all the beliefs that Kurki’s theory aims to explain, but without being nearly as complex as it. Moreover, while Kurki’s theory helpfully raises awareness of the varied nature of legal personhood, I suggest that a pluralist understanding of legal personhood might provide a simpler explanation for that diversity.