TFL Vsebine / Revija Pravnik

7

Prispevek je slavnostni govor, ki ga je imel avtor ob 103. obletnici Pravne fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani. Avtor se je oprl na izročilo pravne znanosti in se ob tem zavedal, da se izročila ne smemo krčevito oklepati in stopicati na mestu. Iz izročila moramo izhajati, ga popravljati in dopolnjevati. Če je treba, ker tako zahtevajo nova spoznanja in nove razmere, ga moramo tudi presegati in kreniti na druga pota. Eno nosilnih mest govora je tudi to, da ustave, zakonov in drugih normativnih pravnih aktov ne moremo uporabljati samodejno. Vselej gre za to, da moramo te akte najpoprej razumeti in se šele nato odločiti, kako naj jih udejanjamo v konkretnih primerih. Za vsakim odgovornim pravnim odločanjem je védenje, da lahko že drobni vrednotni odtenki in nove drobne dejanske okoliščine spremenijo pogled na to, kaj pomenijo prvine pravnega sklepanja in kako naj jih medsebojno povezujemo. Če je to točno, sta razlaga (interpretacija) in utemeljevanje (argumentacija) nujni in nenehni spremljevalki pravnega odločanja. Smisel pravnega razumevanja je, volens nolens, skupen. Dosegamo in poglabljamo ga lahko samo tako, da drug z drugim sodelu- jejo teorija (filozofija) prava in posamezne pozitivnopravne znanosti.

The contribution is the author’s commemorative address marking the 103rd anniversary of the University of Ljubljana Faculty of Law. The author leaned on the tradition of jurisprudence, while being aware that we should not cling to tradition convulsively and stand still. We must start from tradition, correct it and supplement it. If necessary, due to new insights and new circumstances, we must also transcend it and diverge from traditional pathways. Central to the contribution is the idea that constitution, laws and other normative acts cannot be implemented automatically. It is always a matter of first understanding these acts and only then deciding how to implement them in concrete cases. Behind every responsible legal decision-making is the knowledge that even minor value nuances and new minor factual circumstances can influence our perception of what the elements of legal reasoning mean and how they interrelate. If this is correct, interpretation and justification (argumentation) are necessary and constant companions of legal decision-making. The meaning of legal understanding is, volens nolens, shared. It can only be achieved and deepened through a collaborative effort between the theory (philosophy) of law and individual positive legal sciences.

On the Tradition of Legal Science