TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Članek analizira sodbo Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice v zadevi Saadi proti Združenemu kraljestvu, ki se ukvarja z vprašanjem omejitve posega v pravico do osebne svobode po 5. členu Evropske konvencije o človekovih pravicah zaradi preprečitve nedovoljenega vstopa v državo. V aktualni diskusiji o odvzemu prostosti prosilcem za azil so pomembni razlogi, zaradi katerih je sodišče v analiziranem primeru zaključilo, zakaj konvencija ni bila kršena, predvsem ugotovitve, da odvzem prostosti ni bil arbitraren, da lahko vstop pritožnika v državo štejemo za nedovoljen in da konvencija ne zahteva, da bi bil odvzem prostosti nujen oz. sorazmeren. V zvezi z načelom sorazmernosti članek kratko primerja tudi varstvo pravice do osebne svobode v slovenski ustavni ureditvi.

The article strives to present and analyse the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Saadi v. the United Kingdom, dealing with the question of restrictions to the right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This is the first case dealing with the first limb of subparagraph (f) of Article 5(1) of the Convention (regarding the purpose of preventing an unauthorised entry into the country). The reasons that led the court, both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber, to its conclusion that the Convention had not been infringed could become relevant for the current discussion on deprivation of liberty of asylum seekers, especially confronted with the conclusions drawn by the dissenting judges at both instances of the proceedings. Of particular importance are the Court's findings that the deprivation of liberty was not arbitrary, that the applicant's entry into UK was an unauthorized one and that the Convention does not demand a test of necessity or proportionality for the deprivation of liberty in this case. Regarding the test of arbitrariness, the Court in the Grand Chamber judgment laid out the criteria, applicable in the given case, whereas with regards to its findings on authorisation of entry and test of necessity, it relies mainly on its positions from case-law such as Amuur and Chahal. Considering the principle of proportionality, the article entails a very brief comparison to the protection of the right to liberty under the Slovene Constitution, briefly presenting findings from a 2007 judgment by the Administrative Court that pointed out that the standard for the protection of the right to liberty is set higher in the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia than in the European Convention. The question that remains open is whether the European Court of Human Rights is prepared to let the protection of human rights under the European Convention slide under the level of protection, offered by other international instruments of human rights protection, most notably the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.