TFL Vsebine / Revija Javna uprava

Avtor v prispevku obravnava vprašanja, povezana z vezanostjo uprave na odločbe Ustavnega sodišča. V teoriji in praksi se namreč pogosto razpravlja o tem, ali so odločbe Ustavnega sodišča obvezne ali obvezujoče in kaj pravzaprav prvo ali drugo pomeni. Avtor skuša utemeljiti kot ustavnopravni okvir vezanosti uprave na odločbe Ustavnega sodišča drugi odstavek 120. člena v povezavi s 153. členom Ustave. Meni, da iz navedenih določb izhaja več, kot le ugotovitev, da obveznost odločb Ustavnega sodišča pomeni zgolj njihovo pravnomočnost in izvršljivost v klasičnem smislu. Odločbe Ustavnega sodišča in v njihovih obrazložitvah vsebovane razlage posameznih določb Ustave in ustavnopravni standardi so živo pravo, ki se ne izčrpajo v okviru primera, na katerega se posamezna odločba nanaša. Predstavljajo vezno tkivo, ki zagotavlja usklajenost pravnih aktov, s tem pa tudi to, da drugi odstavek 120. člena v povezavi s 153. členom Ustave nista le podlaga naknadne ustavnosodne presoje, temveč podlaga predhodne presoje normodajalca.

In the paper the author deals with questions relating to administration's liability to Constitutional Court's decisions. Theory, as well as practice, witness frequent debates on the question whether Constitutional Court's decisions are obligatory or binding, and what the terms actually mean. The author tries to determine the 2nd paragraph of the Article 120, in connection with the Article 153 of the Constitution, as a constitutional framework of the administration's liability to Constitutional Court's decisions. The author's opinion is that the mentioned provisions result in more than just a finding that liability to Constitutional Court's decisions means merely their finality and enforcement in the classical sense. Constitutional Court's decisions, relating interpretations, and constitutional standards represent a living law, which does not exhaust within a particular case a certain decision relates to. They represent a connective tissue, which assures alignment of legal acts, enabling at the same time that the 2nd paragraph of the Article 120, in connection with the Article 153 of the Constitution, is not merely ground for subsequent constitutional reviews, but a basis for preceding judgement of a legislator.