TFL Vsebine / Pravni letopis

Prispevek se ukvarja z vprašanjem, ali se imetnik motornega vozila proti oškodovancu, ki je pešec, sopotnik ali kolesar, lahko brani z ugovorom, da je za škodni dogodek izključno odgovoren drug imetnik motornega vozila. Geneza tega vprašanja sega več kot sto let nazaj. Leta 1908 je namreč avstrijski zakon uvedel solidarno odgovornost več imetnikov motornih vozil nasproti tretjim. Teorija in praksa v vseh teh desetletjih nista bili enotni, a večinoma sta možnost takšnega ugovora izključevali. Posamezna stališča in posamezne odločbe so ugovor vendarle dopuščale, če je bilo evidentno, da posamezniku ni mogoče pripisati prav nikakršne odgovornosti. Avtor prispevka se sprašuje o naravi objektivne odgovornosti v prometu in o naravi solidarne odgovornosti. Opirajoč se na naravo te odgovornosti in na spremenjeno besedilo novega zakona zagovarja tezo, da je razbremenilni ugovor mogoč v treh primerih. Prvič, kadar je oškodovanec delno ali v celoti prispeval k škodnemu dohodku. Drugič, kadar je drug voznik izključno krivdno odgovoren. In nazadnje, kadar mu uspe izpodbiti domnevno bazo objektivne odgovornosti.

Paper deals with the question whether a person, who owns a car, may exclude his liability towards a pedestrian, passenger or cyclist with the defense that another holder of motor vehicle is exclusively responsible for the accident. The genesis of this issue dates back over a hundred years ago. The Austrian act of 1908 introduced joint liability of motor vehicle holders towards third parties (persons). Theory and case law in all those decades were not uniform, but mainly such a defense was excluded. The defense was exceptionally recognized when it was obvious that an individual is innocent of any kind of liability. The author analyzes the nature of strict liability in traffic and the nature of joint liability. Basing on the nature of strict and joint liability on one the hand and according to changed text in relevant article of the Code of obligations on the other hand, argues, that such an objection is grounded in three cases. First, if a victim itself contributed partialy or exclusively to the accident. Secondly, if another motor vehicle holder is exclusively guilty by criteria of fault liability. And finally, if motor vehicle holder proves that there is not even a slightest actual reason to implicate the rule of presumption of causal link to his case.

About the Defense that Another Holder of Motor Vehicle is Exclusively Liable for the Accident (Code of Obligations, article 154/4)