TFL Vsebine / Revija Pravnik

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Posledica obtožnega načela (19. člen ZKP) je zahteva po objektivni identiteti med obtožbo in sodbo (354. člen ZKP), ki pomeni, da se sme sodba nanašati samo na dejanje, ki ga tožilec opiše v obtožnem aktu. Pomen te zahteve je dvojen. Prvič, s tem ko sme sodišče odločati samo o dejanju, za katerega je tožilec obtožil, ostajata procesni funkciji obtoževanja in odločanja o obtožbi ločeni, kar je prvi pogoj za nepristransko sojenje. Drugič, obdolžencu omogoča, da na podlagi očitka iz obtožbe organizira svojo obrambo. Če bi namreč sodišče obdolženca obsodilo za drugo dejanje, bi mu odvzelo možnost, da se zoper obtožbo učinkovito brani. Avtorica preučuje, ali sme sodišče, ki na glavni obravnavi ugotovi, da se dejanje kaže v drugačni luči, kot ga je opisal tožilec, opis prilagoditi, ne da bi pri tem stopilo v čevlje tožilstva. Nanj odgovarja upoštevaje spoznanja slovenske teorije in na podlagi analize sodne prakse, ki zahtevo o objektivni identiteti obtožbe in sodbe napolnjuje v konkretnih primerih.

A corollary of the accusatorial principle (Article 19 of the Criminal Procedure Act – CPA) is the requirement of objective identity between the charge and the judgment (Article 354 of the CPA). This requirement mandates that the judgment may be based solely on the act described by the prosecutor in the indictment. The significance of this requirement is twofold. First, by limiting the court’s judgment to the act charged by the prosecutor, it preserves the separation between the procedural functions of charging and deciding on the charge, which is essential for ensuring an impartial trial. Second, it allows the accused to organise their defence based on a specific charge brought against them. If the court were to convict the accused of a different offence, it would deprive them of the opportunity to organise an appropriate defence. In this article, I examine whether a court that perceives an act differently during the trial from how the prosecutor described it in the indictment may adjust the description without overstepping into the prosecution’s role. I explore this question by considering the insights of Slovenian legal theory and by analysing case law that interprets the requirement of objective identity between the charge and the judgment in specific cases.

The Limits of Modifying the Description of the Criminal Offence from the Indictment in the Judgment: Interpreting the Requirement of Objective Identity between the Charge and the Judgment