TFL Vsebine / Revija SIR*IUS

Auditor-client management negotiations

V prispevku so predstavljene glavne ugotovitve raziskav o pogajanjih med revizorjem in revidiranim podjetjem, ki jih literatura opredeljuje kot razpravo o nasprotujočih si pogledih med revizorjem in poslovodstvom revidiranega podjetja. Na podlagi proučitve preteklih raziskav obravnavamo revizijska pogajanja, njihove značilnosti ter možne razloge zanje (na primer teoretični model dinamičnih pogajanj med revizorjem in revidiranim podjetjem, angl. Dynamic theory-based model of auditor-client management negotiation, ki sta ga obravnavala Salterio in Gibbins, 2012; proces pogajanj po Brownu in Wrightu, 2008). Na eni strani revizorji in na drugi revidirana podjetja lahko vstopijo v pogajanja z različnimi pogajalskimi strategijami. V prispevku predstavimo možne pogajalske strategije revizorjev in kako pogajalske izkušnje revizorja vplivajo na potek pogajanj. Predstavimo tudi možne strategije v pogajanjih, ki jih lahko uporabijo revidirana podjetja.

In this paper, we present the main findings of previous research on auditor-client management negotiation (auditor's negotiations), which is defined in the literature as the discussion of conflicting views between the auditor and the management of the auditee (auditor's client). Based on the study of previous research, we present audit negotiations, their characteristics, and possible reasons for auditors' negotiations (for example, the Salterio and Gibbins' (2012) Dynamic theory-based model of auditor-client management negotiation; the Brown and Wrights' (2008) negotiation process). On the one hand, the auditors and, on the other hand, auditors' clients (auditees) can enter negotiations using different negotiation strategies. In this paper, we present possible negotiation strategies of auditors and how the auditors' negotiation experience affects the course of the negotiations. At the same time, we also present possible negotiation strategies that auditees can use.