POVZETEK
Ker so sodniki samo ljudje, tudi zanje velja: motiti se je človeško (sodniško). Kjer je napaka, je (praviloma) tudi škoda. Vprašanje pa je, ali je tam tudi odgovornost - in če, čigava. Avtor išče odgovor na vprašanje, katere napake imajo za posledico odškodninsko odgovornost, kdo je tisti, ki je odškodninsko odgovoren, ter na kateri podlagi. Ugotavlja, da gre pri povzročitvi škode zaradi sodniške napake za javnopravno odškodninsko razmerje med državo (ki je povzročila škodo s svojim oblastnim ravnanjem) in civilnim subjektom kot oškodovancem. Ker velja splošna prepoved izvrševanja oblasti na protipraven način, se avtor zavzema za razosebljenje odgovornosti. Krivda, ki se vselej navezuje na konkretnega storilca, bi morala biti tu absorbirana s protipravnostjo ravnanja. Bistveno je, da je bila škoda storjena s protipravnim ravnanjem sodne oblasti. Ko gre za sodniško protipravnost, se je treba spraševati o dolžnem oblastnem ravnanju države kot oblastne entitete in ne o posameznih izvrševalcih te oblasti. Pozornost ni usmerjena na posameznega sodnika, ampak k iskanju odgovora, kako bi morala država (v posamičnem primeru) izvajati sodno oblast. Avtor obravnava tudi vprašanje vzročne zveze (predvsem z vidika dveh praktičnih primerov, ki ju je obravnavalo Vrhovno sodišče RS) ter pomen jurisprudence Sodišča EU. Poudarja, da za Sodišče EU ni toliko bistveno varstvo posameznikovih pravic, kot je bistveno zagotoviti in vzpostaviti enotno uporabo prava EU v nacionalnih jurisdikcijah.
SUMMARY
Since judges are only humans, it holds for them as well: to err is human (thus judicial). And where the error is, there (mostly) is harm. However, the question arises, whether there is also a liability - and if it is, who should be held liable. The author seeks the answer to the question, which errors entail tort liability, which subject is held liable and on which ground. He argues that the damage committed by judicial misconduct constitutes a public-law relationship between the state (which has caused the damage by its authoritative act) and the civil subject as the impaired person. According to the general (and self-evident) prohibition on the unlawful exercise of the state's power, the author argues for the ex-personification of the state's tort liability. As fault has always been ascribed to an individual and particular tortfeasor, it should, in the cases of judicial misconduct, be absorbed by the unlawfulness of the state body's act. What essential here is the mere fact that the damage has been caused by an unlawful act of the judicial power. Since judicial misconduct is at stake, the focus should be paid on the proper exercise of the state's power rather than on the particular individual who has been exercising this power. The attention is thus focused not on particular judge and his conduct but on the question how the state authority should (in that particular case) act and exercise its jurisdiction. The author discusses the question of causation (foremost from the view of two cases of the Supreme Court of Slovenia) and the significance of the jurisprudence of the CJEU. He points out that the CJEU's main goal is the assurance and the establishment of the uniform application of the EU law, rather than safeguarding of the individuals' rights.
TITLE
The Judges' Liability for Damages and State Liability for Judges' Actions
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