TFL Vsebine / Revija Javna uprava

Vprašanje »protivečinskega problema« ustavnega sodišča se v ameriškem ustavnem pravu zgodovinsko naslavlja kot legitimno. Tudi v evropskem prostoru mu ne smemo odrekati legitimnosti kot take. Je pa znatno manj prisoten in stvarno utemeljen. Ustavno sodišče ima jasno začrtan ustavni in zakonski okvir delovanja. Sodnike in sodnice izvoli parlament, v katerem ima vlada večino, z nujnim sodelovanjem dela opozicije, kar pomeni s pravno določeno dvetretjinsko večino. Manevrski prostor za odločanje je zaradi obsežne in vsebinsko podrobnejše ustave, kot je tista v ZDA, znatno manjši. Tak pa je tudi zaradi narave političnega in volilnega sistema: tam dvostrankarski in večinski volilni sistem, tudi strankarsko številnejši, s proporcionalnim volilnim sistemom. Že samo teoretično ustavniško razumevanje ustavne demokracije (kot res demokracije, ne republike) v Evropi zmanjšuje ta problem, še bolj pa ga zmanjšuje model temeljske ustavne demokracije. Ta problem je zato pri nas zanemarljiv.

In the U.S. constitutional law, the issue of the “countermajoritarian problem” of the constitutional court is historically addressed as legitimate. Even in Europe, its legitimacy as such should be acknowledged. The problem is, however, much less present and justified. The Constitutional Court’s constitutional and legal framework is clearly defined. The Justices are elected by the parliament in which the government holds a majority, necessarily co-operating with the opposition, which means a legally prescribed two-thirds majority. The manoeuvring space for decision-making is considerably tighter due to the more extensive and substantially more detailed constitution than the U.S. Constitution. This is also due to the nature of the political and electoral system. Namely, the U.S. has a two-party and majority electoral system. The only theoretical constitutionalistic understanding of constitutional democracy in Europe reduces this problem and is further reduced by the model of fundamental constitutional democracy. In Slovenia, this problem is, therefore, negligible.

On “Countermajoritarian Problem” of the Constitutional Court