TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Eugenio Bulygin, eden glavnih pravoslovcev naše dobe, v tej razpravi preuči zgradbo sodb in vlogo sodnikov pri ustvarjanju prava. Ob tem preizkusi dve trditvi, ki sta med filozofi prava zelo razširjeni, a tudi nevarno zavajajoči: 1., da so sodbe posamične pravne norme, in 2., da z izdajanjem posamičnih pravnih norm sodniki ustvarjajo pravo. Namesto tega utrdi naslednje: (a) Sodbe so sestavljene enote, ki vsebujejo tako posamične kot splošne norme. (b) Sodnik – v nekem smiselnem pomenu »ustvarjanja« – ne ustvarja posamičnih norm; tisto, kar pač ustvarja (vsaj v določenih primerih), so, nasprotno, splošne norme. (c) Te splošne norme, ki jih ustvari sodnik, niso obvezne, lahko pa pridobijo vpliv, s čimer postanejo del pravnega reda. (č) Pomemben prispevek k ustvarjanju prava je sodniško oblikovanje opredelitev pravnih pojmov. (d) Sodna praksa je skupek vplivnih sodniško ustvarjenih splošnih norm in vplivnih sodniško oblikovanih opredelitev.

The purpose of this essay is to examine the structure of judicial decisions and the role the judges play in the creation of law. The author analyses two thesis, which are widely accepted among legal philosophers and lawyers on the one hand, but seem to be dangerously misleading, on the other. According to the first of these two thesis, 1) judicial decisions are individual legal norms. The second one states 2) that by dictating individual legal norms judges create law. In exchange, the author of this essay grounds the following claims: a) Judicial decisions are complex entities consisting of both individual and general norms. b) In a relevant sense of “creating”, a judge does not create individual norms; if anything, a judge—at least in certain cases—creates general norms. c) Those judge-made general norms are not binding. However, they may acquire force and, in that case, they become an integral part of a legal order. d) It is by providing definitions of legal concepts that judges make important contribution to the creation of law. e) The case-law consists of general norms in force, created by judges, and of definitions in force formulated by them.—This being in force has to be distinguished not only from validity (and bindingness), but also from efficacy of norms and definitions. The text (republished a few times and in various languages) was originally published in 1966 in the journal La Ley 124. The Slovenian translation here is made by Andrej Kristan. References to the original shall go to Eugenio Bulygin, Sentencia judicial y creación de derecho, in: Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin, Análisis lógico y derecho, Madrid, Centro de estudios constitucionales, 1991, 355–369.