TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

V prispevku avtor odgovori na Kristanovo kritiko nekaterih argumentov iz njegove zadnje knjige Vladavina zakona (Madrid, Trotta, 2007). V izhodišču poudari, da je zaradi narave nekaterih praktičnih pojmov (kot so avtoriteta, demokracija, svoboda, človekove pravice, vladavina zakona) nemogoče jasno razločiti zgolj pojmovno analizo od utemeljujočega razlogovanja. Vseeno misli, da gre pri njegovi knjigi bolj za opisno rekonstrukcijo vsega tistega, kar je na impliciten način prisotno v javnih institucijah in pri njihovem delovanju, utemeljenem na osebni avtonomiji in, bolj splošno, na idealu vladavine zakona. Zavrne Kristanov ugovor, da njegova trditev, da je vladavina zakona moralni ideal, sestavljen iz določene množice zahtev, ki »morajo biti izpolnjene v največji možni meri«, spreminja ta ideal v zelo ohlapen in dovzeten za množico neprijetnih posledic ter, da je v nekaterih primerih njegov ideal vladavine zakona postavljen prenizko, v drugih pa »nepotrebno utopičen«.

In the paper the author replies to Kristan's critique of some of the arguments from his recently published book The Rule of Law (Madrid, Trotta, 2007). As a starting point, he emphasizes the fact that due to the nature of some practical concepts (e.g. authority, democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law) it is impossible to clearly demarcate the pure conceptual analysis from the justificatory argumentation. However, he thinks his book is more a descriptive reconstruction of everything that is implicitly present in public institutions and their functioning that is founded on personal autonomy and, more generally, on the rule-of-law ideal. He refutes Kristan's objections that his claim that the rule of law is a moral idea, consisting of a certain number of requests that “have to be realized to the greatest possible degree”, makes the ideal vague and susceptible to a number of negative consequences and that in some cases his ideal of the rule of law is set too low, while in others it is unnecessarily utopian.