TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Namen pričujočega članka je predstaviti sistem izločitve (ekskluzije) nezakonitih dokazov v treh sistemih, in sicer pred Evropskih sodiščem za človekove pravice (ESČP), v slovenskem sistemu in po novem hrvaškem ZKP. Pri tem se teoretično glede ekskluzije kažeta dva mogoča pristopa, in sicer: tehtanje nezakonitosti dokaza nasproti preventivnemu vplivu na delo pravosodnih organov – utilitaristično pojmovanje ekskluzije, kot ga uporablja npr. Vrhovno sodišče ZDA, ter absolutno pojmovanje ekskluzije kot izločanje nezakonitih dokazov v vsakem primeru – načelno pojmovanje ekskluzije. Od teh dveh skrajnosti je treba ločiti še tretjo možnost, ki sicer prav tako uporablja metodo tehtanja (kot pri utilitarističnem pojmovanju), vendar na kakovostno drugačen način v smislu poštenosti postopka (kot to metodo uporablja ESČP). V nadaljevanju bo prikazana teorija, kot jo je razvilo ESČP, ter primerjava takšnega sistema s slovenskim sistemom, ki pojmuje ekskluzijo v absolutnem (če ne celo absolutističnem) smislu, ter novim hrvaškim sistemom, ki pa je zašel v skrajnost dajanja prednosti učinkovitosti pregona v smislu 'malikovanja' javnega interesa.

Two theoretical types of the exclusionary rule exist, one based on a principlebased (absolute) approach excluding all illegal evidence, and another based on weighing, including two subcategories: (a) taking into account the preventive influence of police work (used by the U.S. Supreme Court), and (b) taking into account the influence on a fair trial (used by the ECtHR). The Slovenian and the Croatian system are two extremes on the continuum of the exclusionary rule. The first one adopted the absolute approach excluding all illegal evidence and the so called “fruits of the poisonous tree”, and is using an absolute version of the right to remain silent, the second one adopted an extreme utilitarian approach based on public interest. According to this approach, courts assess the legality of evidence by weighing, on the one hand, public interest in criminal prosecution for grave criminal offences, and, on the other hand, interest in the protection of fundamental rights of the individual. In the middle of this continuum, the ECtHR approach could be located – weighing evidence against an overall fair trial (including respect for defence rights, quality of evidence and nature of violation). In the case Jalloh v. Germany the ECtHR adopted a new element – public interest and started (based on public interest) to differentiate between evidence obtained by torture on one hand and by inhuman or degrading treatment on the other hand, and also between directly and indirectly obtained evidence – see also Gäfgen v. Germany. Consequently it moved much further into the “utilitarian” camp. In the author’s opinion, such an approach is a dangerous one, sending a wrong signal to law-enforcement agencies. Instead, he prefers the Slovenian approach (absolute exclusionary rule by law) with judicial corrections (the need to assess the free will of the accused person and to differentiate between the “Miranda” rule on one side and the privilege against self-incrimination on the other side) since the Slovenian absolute approach has some flaws (possibility of misuse by the accused person – the intentional and free listening of evidence before “Miranda” rights are being given).