TFL Vsebine / Revija Pravnik

3

Avtor na podlagi analize odločbe Ustavnega sodišča Republike Slovenije Up- 258/15 razpravlja o problematiki naklepa in zmot pri normativnih zakonskih znakih vrednostne narave. V ospredju njegove razprave je vprašanje, kako presojati zadeve, v katerih se storilec sklicuje na dobronamernost svojega ravnanja. Ali je dobronameren storilec lahko kriv? Ali lahko ravna naklepno, čeprav vsebino nekega zakonskega znaka razume drugače kot večinsko prebivalstvo? Kakšno vlogo imajo pri tem socialna pričakovanja? Pri iskanju odgovorov na ta vprašanja avtor lovi ravnotežje med individualizacijo in objektivizacijo krivde ter se opredeljuje do rešitev, ki jih je na tem področju razvila nemška teorija kazenskega prava.

Starting from the analysis of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia Up-258/15, the author elaborates the problem of intention and errors in case of normative elements of statutory descriptions of criminal offences, especially those of a value nature. At the heart of his discussion is the question of how to assess cases in which the perpetrator refers to the benevolence of his conduct. Can the well-intentioned perpetrator be guilty? Can he act intentionally, although he understands the content of a certain element of statutory definition differently than the majority population? What role do social expectations play? In seeking answers to these questions, the author balances between the individualization and objectification of culpability and takes a stand to solutions developed in this field by the German theory of criminal law.

Benevolence and Culpability: A Marginal Gloss to the Decision of the Constitutional Court Up-258/15 of 30 November 2017