TFL Vsebine / Revija Pravnik

9

Normirana biološko-psihološka metoda ugotavljanja neprištevnosti je neustrezna in vse od svojega nastanka je tarča teoretičnih kritik, v sodni praksi pa nevarne neposlušnosti z uporabo metode zunaj zakonske zamejitve. Problem je teoretično utemeljen na vrednostni presoji svobodne volje, ki ga pravna teorija in zakon vežeta na razumevanje ter obvladovanje ravnanj v pojmih krivde in neprištevnosti. Kljub teoretično izčrpno obravnavanemu razlikovanju voljnosti ravnanja v obeh pojmih pa je zakonska opredelitev neustrezna, kar v sodni praksi pomeni preizkušanje razumevanja in obvladovanja ravnanj zgolj skozi pravila o neprištevnosti. Kot ni vsak duševni bolnik vedno neprišteven, tudi vsak duševno zdrav človek ni vedno prišteven. Slednjega zaradi materialnopravno preozko določenega biološkega kriterija in procesnopravnega dokaznega pravila, da se v primeru dvoma o prištevnosti v postopek pritegne izvedenca psihiatra, praksa ne prepoznava oziroma ga presoja skozi pravila, določena za duševne motnje. Sodni praksi teoretično drsenje obvladovanja voljnosti ravnanja čez različne pravne institute povzroča težave, predvsem ob neobstoju konkretne pravnopolitične odločitve, komu in kdaj pripada krivdni odpustek, ki bi moral biti predvsem z zakonom povsem jasno urejen.

The standardized biological and psychological method of identifying legal insanity is inadequate and has received theoretical criticism since its introduction. In the case law, it is dangerously subject to disobedience by using the method outside legal cap. Theoretically, the problem is based on the value judgment of the free will, bound by legal theory and law to understanding and mastering the conduct in the concepts of guilt and legal insanity. Despite the theoretically comprehensively discussed distinction between the willingness to act in both terms, the statutory definition is inadequate, which in case law implies testing the understanding and management of acts solely through the rules of legal insanity. As not every mental patient is always legally insane, even every mentally healthy person is not always legally sane. The latter is not recognized in practice or evaluated through the rules for mental disorders due to the substantially too narrowly defined biological criterion and the procedural evidence rule which states that in case of doubt, a psychiatrist must be involved as an expert. Case law is having trouble with the theoretical skipping of controlling the willingness to act through various legal institutes, especially in the absence of a concrete legal and political decision about who and when is freed from guilt, which should be clearly regulated, in particular, by law.

On the Appropriateness of the Standardization of the Biological Criterion in the Biological and Psychological Method of Identifying Legal Insanity