TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

In his book A Theory of Legal Personhood (OUP, 2019), Visa Kurki provides a solid account of the historical and systemic elements of the theory of legal personhood in the Western legal tradition. He focuses on the presence or absence of the status of legal personhood in e.g., sentient animals, foetuses, algorithms, and slaves (historically speaking). Still, one key issue is left out of the scope of the book, viz. what do we need the concept of legal personhood for? This review scrutinizes Kurki’s book, providing several minor critiques along the way. It focuses on the above-mentioned problem and argues that instead of scrutinizing the status of legal personhood in some entity, we need to focus on the specific legal rights and duties allocated to such entities based on the legal facts – legal consequences that have been laid down in legislation and jurisdiction.