TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Razumljeno kot sredstvo za reševanje konfliktov med normami je načelo oziroma kriterij lex specialis le ena od mogočih rab ideje lex specialis derogate legi generali. Razveljavljanje (derogacija) namreč ni nujno povezano le s pravnimi antinomijami in lahko do njega pride tudi v odnosu med normami, ki so med seboj sicer skladne. Glede na različne deontične opredelitve so lahko posebne in splošne norme med seboj skladne ali neskladne in ene druge razveljavljajo; kar je pač odvisno tudi od pravil pozitivnega prava. Ta včasih predpisujejo razveljavitev tudi neodvisno od medsebojnih odnosov posebnosti in splošnosti norm.

The principle or the criterion of lex specialis as an instrument of conflict resolution between norms is only one of the possible applications of the idea of lex specialis derogat generali. The main topics of my essay are the following. Speciality of norms is not necessarily connected to legal antinomies and the phenomenon of derogation, because i) general and special norms can be compatible or incompatible with reference to their deontic modalities and ii) the derogation phenomenon regards not only special and general norms but even reciprocal interference terms. If general and special norms are compatible norms, they may derogate each other or be applied together in accordance to the meta-norms of the legal system. A general norm may be derogated by a special one, or vice versa, even if there is no legal antinomy and the reasons of derogation of norms may be various: in legal systems, derogation depends on speciality, generality, proportionality, authority, competence, occasio legis, etc. When general and special norms are applied together, one of the main functions of special norms is to give a specification of the general ones so as to complete the regulation of the case. The property of speciality or generality is a content-dependent feature of norms that implies both semantic and value choices. It is a semantic problem due to it regards in particular legal concepts, and not the words in which norms are formulated in legal texts. As a consequence the principle or the criterion of lex specialis is a tool to decide which norm has to be applied or disapplied and not a tool for interpreting legal statements. The speciality and generality of norms implies value choices too, because generality means justice as formal equality and speciality means justice as fairness.