TFL Vsebine / Revija Pravnik

7

Bosansko-hercegovska ustava določa, da so lahko člani tričlanskega Predsed- stva BiH zgolj bosansko-hercegovski državljani, ki so pripadniki enega od treh konstitutivnih narodov v BiH – Bošnjaki, Hrvati in Srbi. Preostale državljane BiH, ki niso pripadniki enega od treh konstitutivnih narodov, oziroma ustav- no kategorijo »drugi« pa negativno diskriminira, saj ji ne omogoča članstva v Predsedstvu BiH. Zato je Evropsko sodišče za človekove pravice v zadevah Sejdić-Finci proti BiH, Zornić proti BiH in Šlaku proti BiH ugotovilo, da pomeni taka ustavna določba kršitev 1. člena Protokola 12 k ESČP. V zadevi Pilav proti BiH pa je ESČP potrdilo, da Ustava BiH povzroča tudi ozemeljsko diskrimi- nacijo in neenakost med konstitutivnimi narodi BiH. Čeprav si tako domača kot tudi tuja politična in strokovna javnost že leta prizadevata za čimprejšnjo uresničitev omenjenih sodb ESČP, ustavna diskriminacija še vedno ni odpra- vljena. Avtorica analizira vse javnosti predstavljene ustavnorevizijske predloge in ugotavlja, kakšna ustavna rešitev je s stališča stroke najprimernejša za BiH, ter kakšna je politično najsprejemljivejša rešitev. Bralcu predstavi tudi ustav- norevizijsko rešitev, ki je po njenem mnenju najprimernejša za BiH.

The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina stipulates that the members of the three-member Presidency of BiH may be Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizens who are members of one of the three constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegov- ina – Bosnians, Croats and Serbs. Other BiH citizens who are not members of one of the three constituent nations (the constitutional category “others”) are negatively discriminated because they are not allowed to be members of the BiH Presidency. Therefore, the European Court of Human Rights in cas- es Sejdić and Finci v. BiH, Zornić v. BiH, and Šlaku v. BiH found that such a constitutional provision means a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the ECtHR. In the case of Pilav v. BiH, the European Court of Human Rights con- firmed that the Constitution of BiH also causes territorial discrimination and inequality between the constituent peoples of BiH themselves. Although the domestic and foreign political and professional public have been striving for the implementation of the aforementioned judgments of the European Court of Human Rights as early as possible, constitutional discrimination has not yet been resolved. The author analyses the constitutional-reform proposals pre- sented to the public and finds out what constitutional solution is most legally suitable for BiH and which is most politically acceptable. She also presents a constitutional-reform solution which according to her is most appropriate for BiH.

The Abolition of Constitutional Discrimination in the Presidential Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina