TFL Vsebine / Zbornik znanstvenih razprav

Pričakovana (in zahtevana) hvaležnost obdarjenca, ki je utemeljena z neodplačnostjo darilne pogodbe, se najbolj izrazito kaže v obliki preklica darila zaradi hude nehvaležnosti. Darovalec lahko prekliče darilno pogodbo zaradi hude nehvaležnosti, če se po njeni sklenitvi obdarjenec proti njemu ali njegovemu bližnjemu obnaša tako, da bi bilo po temeljnih moralnih načelih nepravično, da bi obdarjenec prejeto obdržal. Upoštevaje težavnost opredelitve darila ter primerjalnopravno neenotnost ureditve daril in neodplačnih pravnih poslov, ne preseneča, da se pri uporabi instituta preklica darila zaradi nehvaležnosti pojavljajo praktične težave. Te izhajajo iz neopredeljenega teoretičnega izhodišča, najizraziteje pa se kažejo pri remunatoričnih darilih, darilih danih iz drugih posebnih nagibov, ter v okoliščinah, v katerih je obdarjenec svojo moralno obveznost hvaležnosti že izpolnil. Sociološki in antropološki zaključek je, da je družbeni pojav dajanja, prejemanja in vračanja daril odvisen od konteksta (okoliščin) primera, predvsem pa vseh kompleksnosti razmerja med konkretnim darovalcem in konkretnim obdarjencem. Zdi se, da pravni sistemi neuspešno poskušajo uporabiti splošne pogodbenopravne (tržne) režime na darilih, ki so nedvomno, zunajtržna in s tem v bistvenem nepogodbena kategorija. Posebna pravila, ki naj bi odražala posebnost daril kot neodplačnih pravnih poslov, so pravzaprav zgolj izraz nezaupljivosti prava do daril. Bistveno odprto vprašanje je, ali je ta nezaupljivost utemeljena ali pa je zgolj posledica zastarelih zgodovinskih teoretičnih izhodišč.

The expected (and required) gratitude of a donee justified by the gratuitous nature of the donation contract is most clearly shown in the form of revocation of a gift due to severe ingratitude. The donor may revoke a gift contract due to severe ingratitude if, after its conclusion, the donee behaves towards them or their close relations in such a way that it would be unfair according to basic moral principles for the donee to keep the gift. Given the difficulty of defining the gift and the inconsistency of the regulation of gifts and gratuitous legal transactions in comparative law, it is not surprising that practical difficulties exist with gift revocations due to ingratitude. These are a consequence of an undefined theoretical basis and are most pronounced in remunatory gifts, gifts given out of other special inclinations, and in circumstances where the donee has already fulfilled their moral obligation of gratitude. The sociological and anthropological conclusion is that the social phenomenon of giving, receiving, and returning gifts depends on the context (circumstances) of the case, and above all on all the complexities of the relationship between a specific donor and a specific donee. Legal systems seem to be unsuccessfully trying to apply general contract law (market) regimes to gifts, which are undoubtedly non-commercial and thus, in essence, a non-contractual category. The special rules, which are supposed to reflect the specificity of gifts as gratuitous legal transactions, could be seen as merely an expression of the distrust of gifts by the law. The essentially unanswered question is whether this distrust is justified or is merely the result of outdated historical theoretical foundations.