TFL Vsebine / Revija Revus

Verske svoboščine (religious liberties, freedom of religion) so v ameriškem ustavnem pravu zajamčene v 1. amandmaju Listine pravic. Namen temeljnih ustavnih klavzul – ustanovitvene klavzule (na podlagi katere zakonodajalec ne sme sprejeti nobenega zakona, ki bi se nanašal na ustanovitev verske skupnosti) in klavzule svobodnega izvrševanja (na podlagi katere zakonodajalec ne sme sprejeti nobenega zakona, ki bi omejeval svobodno izvrševanje veroizpovedi) je vzpostavitev t. i. wall of separation med državo in verskimi skupnostmi. Državna oblast bi se morala vzdržati preferiranja veroizpovedi pa tudi njenega zaviranja. Vzdržati bi se morala interpretiranja verskih vprašanj in medverskih nasprotovanj. V tej luči je najvišje sodno telo v ZDA – Vrhovno sodišče – glede obeh klavzul prvega amandmaja izoblikovalo določena načela, ki morajo biti upoštevana pri vprašanju, ali določeni akt državne oblasti krši posameznikove verske svoboščine.

The author’s main focus is on the two “religion clauses” of the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States. These clauses – “the establishment clause” (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”) and the “free exercise clause” (“Congress shall make no law [...] prohibiting the free exercise thereof”) are the crucial aspects of the “wall of separation” between the State and religion. These clauses have been precisely defined by the US Supreme Court in its long practice. The basic “test” whether a State act is in accordance with the first amendment is in Lemon v. Kurtzman which establishes the Lemon test. According to this test (1) the Law or a State act must have a secular purpose, (2) the primary effect of it must be that it neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) it must not foster “excessive government entanglement” with religion. Only if a State act meets these standards does it not infringe the religion freedoms set out in the first amendment.