TFL Vsebine / Revija Javna uprava

Avtor ugotavlja, da tri odločitve Vrhovnega sodišča iz leta 2023, in sicer sodbi v zadevah II Ips 8/2022 z dne 19. aprila 2023 in II Ips 49/2023 z dne 18. oktobra 2023 ter sodba in sklep v zadevi II Ips 54/2023 z dne 20. septembra 2023, pomenijo bistveno novo sodno prakso glede pojasnilne dolžnosti bank pri sklepanju kreditnih pogodb v švicarskih frankih. Tako zakoni, njihova razlaga kot tudi druge okoliščine ob času sklepanja pogodb niso zahtevale take izvedbe pojasnilne dolžnosti, kot izhaja iz predmetnih sodnih odločb Vrhovnega sodišča. To pomeni, da je nova sodna praksa Vrhovnega sodišča v obravnavanih primerih uporabljena retroaktivno, torej na primere, ki so se zgodili petnajst let, preden se je ta nova praksa oblikovala. Avtor ugotavlja, da tako pravna doktrina kot tudi sodna praksa uporabljata kriterij razumne predvidljivosti pri ocenjevanju dopustnosti retroaktivne uporabe nove sodne razlage prava. Ta je v primeru, kadar neugodno vpliva na položaj stranke, dopustna le, če je stranka mogla v času njenega pravno relevantnega ravnanja razumno predvideti, kakšna bo prihodnja sodna razlaga prava glede tega ravnanja. Po proučitvi vseh okoliščin avtor meni, da ob objektivni oceni ni mogoče trditi, da so banke lahko že pred petnajstimi leti razumno pričakovale, da bodo zahteve glede pojasnilne dolžnosti tako stroge, kot izhaja iz nove sodne prakse Vrhovnega sodišča. Avtor tudi opozarja, da vprašanja retroaktivne uporabe te sodne prakse Vrhovno sodišče v navedenih sodnih odločbah ni niti obravnavalo in torej ni obrazložilo, zakaj meni, da je retroaktivna uporaba nove sodne prakse v teh primerih dopustna. To pa samo po sebi pomeni pomanjkljivo obrazloženost sodnih odločb in s tem kršitev 22. člena Ustave.

The author notes that three 2023 decisions of the Supreme Court, namely the judgments in the cases II Ips 8/2022 of 19 April 2023 and II Ips 49/2023 of 18 October 2023 and the judgment and decision in the case II Ips 54/2023 of 20 September 2023, mark a significant shift in jurisprudence regarding the explanatory duty of banks when concluding credit agreements in Swiss francs. Previously, neither the laws nor their interpretation, nor other relevant circumstances at the time of contract conclusion, mandated such an implementation of the duty to explain, as derived from the Supreme Court’s case law. This implies that the new Supreme Court case law in these cases is applied retroactively, i.e. to cases that occurred fifteen years before the establishment of this new practice. Both legal doctrine and case law employ the criterion of reasonable foreseeability in determining the permissibility of retroactively applying a new judicial interpretation of the law. Retroactive application is only permissible if it adversely affects a party’s position and if, at the time of the party’s legally significant actions, they could have reasonably anticipated the future judicial interpretation of the law concerning these actions. It cannot be claimed that even fifteen years ago, banks could have reasonably foreseen the stringent requirements of the duty to explain as it appears in the Supreme Court’s recent case law. Moreover, the Supreme Court, in the aforementioned judgments, did not even consider the issue of retroactive application of this case law, thereby failing to justify its view that such retroactive application of new case law is permissible in these cases. This omission constitutes a deficient reasoning of court decisions and thus a violation of Article 22 of the Constitution.

Reflection on the Retroactive Application of a Change in Case-Law Regarding the Duty of Explanation when Concluding Swiss Francs Credit Agreements